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Abstract 
This study aims to provide the answer to the question if intergenerational social 
mobility has an effect on tolerance to corruption. By merging together two fields of 
literature in social science – corruption and equality of opportunities offered in a society 
and performing statistical analysis this paper provides some evidences that societal 
mobility and tolerance to corruption are correlated. 
The question of intergenerational social mobility has not been thoroughly investigated 
due to the limitations in the data availability. However recent studies in OECD countries 
allowed looking more in-depth into the phenomenon, giving an opportunity to fill in the 
gap in the theories. Analyzing tolerance to corruption effects of social mobility with 
measurement of actual social mobility was rarely employed in the quantitative analysis 
earlier. Using the data obtained from the World Value Review (Wave 6) for almost 
22 000 individuals from the OECD countries, including their socio-demographic 
characteristics and perceived social mobility parameters, combined with the OECD 
dataset on the intergenerational educational attainment and earning elasticity, the 
study indicates that individual’s perception of society as mobile leads to lower tolerance 
of corruption. This relation holds regardless the level of societal trust and general 
satisfaction with life. Moreover, study concludes that educational mobility may also 
have negative effect on tolerance to corruption. 
This study contributes to the understanding why some countries succeeded in 
maintaining high quality of governance with low level of corruption whereas others 
trapped with dysfunctional political institutions. 
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1. Introduction 
“Once social change begins, it cannot be reversed. You cannot uneducate the person who 
has learned to read. You cannot humiliate the person who feels pride. You cannot oppress 
the people who are not afraid anymore. We have seen the future, and the future is ours” 
(Cezar Chavez, 1984) 
The recent studies on the quality of government and the effectiveness of bureaucratic 
institutions proven that these are the key aspects to economic growth and social 
welfare. Good governance is a prerequisite for well-functioning institutions and low 
level of corruption. Even though the concept of quality of government is still new to the 
researchers, one can conclude that impartiality of institutions is a basic principle in 
defining the good governance. Hence equal opportunities of different groups of society 
can provide both social and economic progress in a country. In other words how power 
is exercised first of all depends on how the access to the power is provided (Rothstein & 
Teorell, 2008). 
Moreover equality of opportunities lies at the core of democratic principles which 
ensures high development of state growth and reduction of corruption consequently. 
For example, Fischer (2009) argues that fair and impartial government decisions have 
direct impact on country’s welfare if they are provided by strong rule of law and 
institutional efficiency (Fischer, 2009). At the same time, Roemer (2002) shows that 
equal opportunities refer often to equal set of choices offered to the individual in the 
society whereas the core concept of human preferences, his way of perception and 
resources available are ignored in the egalitarian theories. As Dworkin (1981) argued 
individual cannot be responsible for the resources available but rather for the set of 
individual preferences. In other words individuals are to be held accountable for the 
actions and choices society entitles him to be responsible (Dworkin 1981 as cited in 
Roemer, 2002). Hence, the equality of opportunities regardless individual’s background 
should ideally provide equal access to resources and in societies. In other words, 
societies where these opportunities are offered can be considered as mobile. But does 
this necessarily provide better functioning institutions in a country?  
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However, inequality of income distribution and the initial welfare of an individual, often 
determine the avenues open for intergenerational social mobility regardless of the 
opportunities offered by the governmental institutions. On the other hand, persistence 
in occupation across generations creates certain pattern on the labor market and 
economic development shaping socio-economic institutions of a country in the long 
time perspective. Empirical testing proved that high income inequality has direct impact 
on low intergenerational social mobility (D’Addio, 2007).  
Other scholars emphasize that intergenerational social mobility often arises from the 
inequality of opportunities provided to the individuals in a society when personal talent 
and achievements are correlated and opposed to the family background and social 
status obtained by an individual at birth (Corak, 2013). Moreover, raising income 
inequality leads to the stronger bonds with family background making it more difficult 
for an individual to achieve higher income and move “between classes” due to his/her 
personal talents (OECD 2011 cited at Corak, 2013). On the other hand, corruption is 
often defined as a “hierarchical phenomenon” when individuals with access to power 
exercise this power through obtaining personal benefits. In other words, in corrupted 
societies hierarchy (or social class) is a way of establishing order and structure as a 
coordination mechanism (Bac, 1996).   
Contrary, intergenerational social mobility is a mechanism of assessing policies 
implemented by the country’s government identifying socio-economic factors for which 
an individual cannot be held responsible. However the mechanism by itself cannot be 
used as a policy recommendation tool because social mobility only contributing to a 
part of inequality problem solution and therefore does not identify how intergeneration 
social mobility should function and how it affects quality of institutions in a country 
(D’Addio, 2007). On the other hand measuring intergenerational social mobility can 
help to identify and reduce inequalities of opportunities given to an individual at birth 
and with this to shape lower tolerance towards corruption and provide development of 
good governance as a consequence.  
From the discussion above can one conclude that impartiality of government decisions 
and equality of opportunities engage individuals to be responsible for the social and 
political welfare and level of corruption in the country consequently? Put it in other way 
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can intergenerational social mobility/immobility affect tolerance to corruption? The 
social scientists discussed thoroughly the impact of economic welfare on corruption 
(Kaufmann 2007; Kurtz 2007; Charron & Lapuente 2010) at the same time the 
connection between social mobility and economic welfare of a country is relatively 
recent research area and it was mainly tested from economic point of view (Fischer 
2009; D’Addio 2007).  
From one point of view economic inequality establishes a greater degree of social 
inequality as different groups of society cannot benefit from the full and universal 
access to the country’s welfare. Low-income groups tend to believe that access to the 
economic resources is limited and therefore “rich” groups benefit more from the access 
to power. Therefore, a society with a high level of economic inequality enters a circle of 
“causal chain” when citizens stop trusting the groups in-power, and as a consequence, 
the government (in-power groups) is unable to establish better social welfare programs 
as citizens do not entrust them with resources  (Rothstein, 2011).   
The causal relation between the quality of government and how corruption may 
prevent an economic growth and equal access to resources in a country was discussed 
by the Social and Economic Science Schools (Rothstein 2011; Fischer 2009; D’Addio 
2007). On the contrary the impact of social mobility on the attitude to corruption, and 
the level of corruption a country consequently, are not in the focus of the social 
researchers and therefore reveal a gap of analyses on the inequality of opportunities 
and corruption in a society.  
1.1 Research aim and question 
This study aims to fulfill the research gap in quality of government field and evaluate 
the tolerance to corruption effect of intergenerational social mobility in a country. The 
paper covers different theories and approaches on equality, intergenerational social 
mobility and corruption in order to assess the relationship between mechanisms of 
social inequalities persistence over time and tolerance to bad governance. It should be 
noted, that measurement of social mobility lacks the common definition among the 
researchers, therefore this paper explores Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries as a representative sample where most of the previous 
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studies in the field of social mobility were conducted and actual data can be obtained. 
Hence, the objective of this research is to identify the effect of the intergenerational 
social mobility in conjunction with the tolerance to corruption in the OECD countries. 
Thus, this research addresses the following questions: 
 Does intergenerational social mobility affect the tolerance to corruption in the 
OECD countries? 
 What is the tolerance to corruption effects of the intergenerational social 
mobility in the OECD countries?  
1.2 Disposition 
First the existing explanation of corruption in connection with inequality issues and 
intergenerational social mobility are critically discussed based on the previous 
empirical and theoretical studies. Then, the concepts of actual and perceived 
intergenerational social mobility are introduced. Hence this research paper is organized 
as following: the existing literature on corruption, impartiality and social mobility are 
discussed in Section 2, Section 3 includes the description of research method and data 
description; followed by the empirical analysis and testing of research hypothesis in 
Section 4. Finally, study limitations and conclusion are presented. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Quality of Government and Corruption 
The concept of quality of government developed by the social scientists determines 
impartiality as a fundamental principle of institutional activity. The existing literature 
argues that impartiality provides economic development, social welfare and low 
corruption as a consequence. For example Rothstein and Teorell (2008) suggest that 
well performing countries apply and follow the principle of impartiality in the areas of 
public administration and public choice which in its turn provides establishment of the 
rule of law and government effectiveness and accountability. Therefore authors point 
out that good governance depends not only on the equal access to the power but on the 
way this power is exercised by the authorities. However input (access) and output 
(exercise) side of exercising political power shall be distinguished and hence equality 
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and impartiality are interdependent concepts. Moreover authors emphasize that 
democratic political regime is one of the main conditions for high quality of government 
although it cannot be sufficient condition all alone. Nonetheless democracy provide 
regulatory basis of equal access to power and establishes laws on decreasing incentive 
to corruption. The normative limits established by the legitimate democratic regimes 
enable both impartiality and equality. Thus democracy is a prerequisite for accessing 
power whereas exercising power is affected directly by impartiality (Rothstein & 
Teorell, 2008).  
Other scholars also follow the idea of importance of the institutional structure and 
political regime in high quality of government and decreasing corruption. For example, 
Olsson (1993) suggests that uncertainty implied by dictatorships often prevent state 
from providing good governance and economic welfare. According to him the cost of 
public goods in autocratic regimes devaluates with time any benefits received from 
them, at the same time autocrats act in their own interests aiming by limiting access to 
power of certain groups of society with this diminishing possibility for establishing 
impartial political and economic institutions. Thus the idea of impartiality together with 
democratic regimes discussed more thoroughly by Rothstein and Teorell (2008) secure 
decreasing of corruption and establishing stability in rule of law over generations 
instead of insuring stability for short-terms (Olsson, 1993). 
However existing literature on political regimes and corruption is not fully supported 
by empirical findings, and therefore cannot explain the mechanisms of corruption and 
why some societies have higher degree of tolerance towards it. On the contrary 
corruption remains a threat to democratic institutions and values of equality and 
impartiality through decreasing social trust in political institutions. Therefore 
corruption is an opposite concept to impartiality and defined by Mungiu - Pippidi 
(2006) as “particularism” to certain individuals or groups of society contradicting with 
idea of equal distribution of good in a country. Hence corruption becomes more difficult 
to control when majority of individuals tolerate existing bad governance. In other words 
corrupted governments are built in highly hierarchical societies and equal treatment is 
guaranteed not to every individual or citizens as a whole but on the contrary - to 
individuals belonging to the same social group. The major solution of addressing 
corruption by implementing principle of impartiality does not work in these societies 
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and shifts to identifying corrupted privileged groups and solve this dilemma instead 
(Mungiu - Pippidi, 2006).  
Corruption therefore depends highly on social fractionalization and hierarchies among 
people. Bac (1996) argues that the problem of corruption can be addressed be the 
mechanism of check and monitoring from individuals belonging to the different social 
segments (groups). In his article author takes different prospective and suggests that 
hierarchically structured society can benefit directly in decreasing corruption 
developing a system of independent control. Nonetheless, structurally independent 
segments are prerequisites for creating controlling system moreover the success 
depends highly on monitoring costs (Bac, 1996). 
On the contrary some scholars suggest that high fragmentation of society and significant 
inequalities in economic wealth increase the level of corruption. Sanjeev (2005) argues 
that inequality creates social groups without access to power and therefore they have 
fewer instruments to participate in the system of check and monitoring of corrupted 
institutions. Hence inequality contributes to establishing social norms of higher degree 
of acceptance and tolerance towards bad governance as a logical part of economic 
growth. In democratic regimes this negative effect can be more severe as privileged 
groups which have access to power tend to generate policies protecting their interests 
rather than interests of majority of individuals in society.  On the other hand corruption 
exacerbates the existing welfare gap between the different groups of society. Therefore 
inequalities paired with corruption decrease possibility of good governance 
development (Sanjeev & You, 2005).  
Another widely accepted approach in addressing the relation between country’s welfare 
and quality of government deals with the “power resource” theory. The welfare 
societies are seen as a byproduct of the industrial development and thus, the role of an 
individual is determined by his occupation or social class as a whole. As a consequence, 
the development of a state is therefore determined by the social class structure in a 
country. Moreover, distribution of resources in a country becomes predetermined by 
the class structure in a society. From this perspective demands of a class can further 
influence the political and economic structure of a state (Korpi, 2006). However 
Rothstein (2011) argues that class structure of a society does not necessarily reveal 
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increase in political corruption but on the contrary the state itself may have a leading 
role in mobilizing classes and providing better opportunities and more equality among 
different groups of a society (Rothstein, 2011). 
From the discussion above one can conclude that non-corrupt states acknowledge the 
fact of heterogeneity in society and existence of classes with different set of 
opportunities. Theoretically, these issues can be addressed by impartiality and offering 
equal access to the opportunities. Or, on the contrary, corruption can be monitored 
through a clear hierarchy and a system of control at different levels of a societal 
structure (Bac, 1996). 
The analysis of corruption often focuses on the macro level studies comparing the cross-
country data. On the other hand, recent studies on corruption also try to grasp the 
concept of individual characteristics and their role in the tolerance to corruption in 
society. For example, Gatti et al. (2003) built their study of corruption based on the 
micro-economic determinants of a society and conclude that gender, age, employment 
status and income level can be determinants in attitude to corruption and as a 
consequence are closely associated with the tolerance to corruption in a country (Gatti 
et al., 2003). 
To sum up, existing studies on the high quality of government and level of corruption 
explain the connection between good institutions and their impact on country’s growth 
whereas the studies on the individual’s impact in building better institutions are quite 
limited. Moreover, the theories on quality of government and corruption often omit the 
issue of class fragmentation in society and intergenerational social mobility. At the same 
time great amount of literature analyzes inequality in terms of higher degree of 
tolerance towards corruption. However, only indirect theoretical evidences were 
presented by the researchers on the effect of intergenerational social mobility on the 
average tolerance to corruption. 
2.2 Tolerance to Corruption and Social Trust 
Attitude to corruption in a society, on the other hand, reflects the social norms 
acceptable in a country which often can be a mirroring factor of culture and reveal the 
causal relation between the interpersonal trust and tolerance to nepotism, clientelism 
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(components of corruption). Thus, social trust is often seen as a defining factor in 
establishing non-material capital in a country and provides higher degree of interaction 
between the individuals in a society. For example Svendsen (2003) tests the value of 
social trust in terms of transaction costs in a society and further concludes that even 
economic growth of a state is strongly correlated with the level of social trust. In other 
words, micro-level interactions based on trust provide the base for macro-level growth 
through the societal structure and collective contribution to social capital as a 
consequence (Svedsen and Svedsen, 2003). 
Similarly, Rothstein (2011) argues that social trust as a major way of interaction among 
the individuals establishes an “informal institution” or a form of mutually beneficial 
cooperation for all level of actors. But on the other hand, in the corrupted societies elite 
groups, or those who are close to the resource distribution, may benefit the most in this 
situation when corruption is perceived in terms of other people’s beliefs (Rothstein, 
2011). This leads to the assumption that corruption can be overcome if the strong 
informal institutions like social trust can be established as a form of checks and controls.  
On the other hand, Widmalm (2008) tests if corruption can become a trap to a society, 
i.e. once institutions in a country are classified as corrupted it implies lower moral 
norms and standards to the whole society and the system of checks and controls does 
not function. In other words, corruption and social norms become a vicious circle, when 
corruption is seen as an acceptable norm. However, author concludes that corruption by 
itself does not correlate with individual’s attitude towards corrupted practices like 
accepting bribes among the officials (Widmaml, 2008). This indicates that cultural 
acceptance of corruption and tolerance to the corrupted institutions does not 
necessarily reveals direct positive correlation between two variables, but at the same 
time may have impact in individual understanding and acceptance of societal norms. 
2.3 Social Mobility 
Existing literature addresses the problem of social mobility mostly from economic point 
of view measuring inequality of opportunities and its effect on the economic growth and 
welfare development. For example Fischer (2009) develops studies to discuss the 
relationship between the intergeneration social mobility and subjective well-being 
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measured by earning differences of parent and child pair. However author identifies 
that actual and perceived intergenerational social mobility may have different effect on 
income inequalities, economic development, and individual satisfaction with socio-
economic wellbeing (Fischer, 2009).   
It is important to distinguish here between two major types of intergenerational social 
mobility – actual and perceived defined by the scientists. D’Addio (2009) identifies that 
actual social mobility is measured in terms of intergenerational earnings gap and 
therefore varies highly among households’ income. At the same time actual social 
mobility depends often on the income and education inequalities (D’Addio, 2009). On 
the other hand perceived social mobility is more complex concept and deals with 
individual perception of equal opportunities for education and possibility to escape 
poverty offered by society in this country. Therefore perceived social mobility is seen as 
a moderate tool of lowering subjective wellbeing and providing higher tolerance 
towards inequalities in society contrary to the actual social mobility. However Fischer 
identifies that inequalities are easier tolerated in intergenerational immobile societies 
(Fischer, 2009).  
Low social mobility has direct impact on inefficient economic development of a state 
diminishing satisfaction in political institutions. Even though economic theories 
suggests that inequalities in society provide higher incentive to move from one social 
class to another and with this effect economic growth, Breen (1997) argues that 
individual abilities do not often meet the actual social position and creates higher 
degree of social dissatisfaction. Therefore in his study author provides statistical proves 
that social mobility and economic growth do not have linearly positive relation but on 
the contrary increasing welfare gap in society generates lower productivity, decreasing 
trust and satisfaction in government institutions. This economic gap and prospect of 
higher social mobility may be an ineffective socio-economic policy for improving social 
and economic performance of a state (Breen, 1997).  
Nonetheless, social mobility is not only a mechanism of overcoming economic 
inequalities but on the other hand might be used as a tool of justifying and maintaining 
bad institutions. For example, Mungiu-Pippidi (2006) argues that government promises 
of high social mobility can be used as a mechanism of control in authoritarian and 
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corrupted regimes. These open channels of migrating from a lower social group to the 
privileged one enables individuals to use these upward mobility channels which are 
often easy and fast way to succeed contrary to the idea of changing the whole system 
and establishing functioning institutions. Therefore corrupted regimes prefer to engage 
individuals from lower social groups into their “game” with this insuring higher 
tolerance towards corruption and support to the existing system as a whole (Mungiu-
Pippidi, 2006).  
Social mobility and questions of inequality are especially observable in the competitive 
market economies. Similar to the analysis performed by Mungiu-Pippidi, Kolankiewicz 
(1996) also addresses the issue of the equal access and control over power and 
distribution of income. However author suggests in his article that existing social 
mobility in corrupted countries is provided by market forces and mechanisms 
generating communication and interdependence of social groups within one country. At 
the same time well-functioning economy is forced to provide equal opportunities due to 
the higher demand for educated and experienced labor establishing with this social 
networking and connections with governmental institutions (Kolankiewicz, 1996).  
However, intergenerational social mobility can also be seen as a by-pass of economic 
and social policies implemented in a country. In other words, if social mobility is treated 
as a combined measurement of two components – educational attainments of 
child/parent pair and wage mobility through generations, then education often shows 
direct impact on wage persistence. At the same time policies implemented in a state 
(resource access and distribution) are positively correlated with the wage mobility 
(Causa et al., 2009).   
Nonetheless low social mobility and inequality is not only used as a tool of maintaining 
corrupted institutions out of fear of being overthrown in authoritarian regimes but it 
also creates certain social norms and beliefs tolerating bad governance. Sanjeev (2005) 
suggests that easier acceptance of corrupted institutions can be explained both by 
economic and normative mechanisms when in a long period of time corruption 
becomes a social norm accepted by the individuals in society. However contrary to 
Mungiu-Pippidi theory, author believes that individuals with higher income have better 
opportunities to enter government institutions and therefore being engaged in 
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corruption whereas people excluded from access to political institutions are also limited 
in their rights to monitor and control bad governance increasing with this 
intergenerational social immobility. Therefore the impact of low social mobility and 
inequality on corruption is not just direct but also reverse because in a long run 
corrupted institutions and bad governance promotes higher immobility and wealfare 
gap (Sanjeev & You, 2005).   
At this point it is interesting to refer to the egalitarian theory where the basic and one of 
the major principles of equal opportunities emphasizes not only the equality of set of 
choices made by individual but what is more important - equality of responsibilities that 
shall be considered by individuals in society. Roemer (2002) discusses that 
responsibilities taken by individual for the choices he made can ensure more equal 
treatment both on economic and social level. Nonetheless this aspect is often left 
ignored by the economists arguing for utilitarian redistribution of income which in its 
turn involve less effective socio-economic policies developed by dysfunctional 
institutions. At the same time changes in policies have direct impact on decreasing or 
increasing welfare gap and social mobility opportunities (Roemer, 2002). Therefore 
individual taking responsibility for his actions is held accountable for institutional 
choices he makes and quality of government consequently.    
On the other hand being accountable for the set of choices cannot create or increase the 
trust of an individual in governmental institutions especially if they are proved to be 
dysfunctional and highly corrupted. Morris and Klesner (2010) suggest that trust is a 
major and most effective mechanism to involve society in eliminating corruption. 
Therefore one can conclude that perceived corruption in a country depends first of all 
on normative believes in institutions of the social groups excluded from access to power. 
Similar to Sajeev & You (2005) arguments, this study shows that corruption creates 
reverse causal effect generating mistrust among poor groups of society and increasing 
with this heterogeneity within the society. However being a part of corrupted group 
neither provides trust in governmental organizations nor helps to get rid of corruption 
(Morris & Klesner, 2010). Hence, from the egalitarian prospective, individual decreases 
the level of personal responsibility in fight against corruption. 
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2.3.1 Social Mobility and Institutions 
From the discussion above, it can be argued that social mobility can be used as a 
mechanism of improving economic efficiency and developing good governance. 
However the concepts of social mobility, impartiality and good governance are closely 
interrelated and can compound each other (Pearce, 2011). Hence, the combination may 
lead to the negative effect as well and corrupted institutions creating lower trust in 
governance and growing economic gap promote among individuals incentive to have 
access to the power rather than changing the system as a whole which increases 
tolerance towards corruption. Therefore the relation between intergenerational social 
mobility and tolerance to corruption shall be assessed more thoroughly as one of the 
direct way of ensuring better governance, promoting equal opportunities and 
impartiality.  
2.3 Research Hypotheses 
This research aims to test whether tolerance to corruption is correlated with the 
intergenerational social mobility based on the data available for the OECD countries. For 
this purpose ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis is performed. Estimators 
identified in the regression analysis help to explain the effects of independent variable 
(social mobility) on dependent variable (tolerance to corruption) and answer the 
question if there is a causal relation between the level of social mobility in a country and 
attitude (tolerance) to corruption in a society.  
In order address the research questions the following hypotheses were drawn:  
Hypothesis 1: Intergenerational social mobility is negatively correlated with the 
tolerance towards corruption in a country.   
Hypothesis 2: Intergenerational social mobility and higher life satisfaction have 
negative effect on the tolerance to corruption. 
Based on the existing studies in the field of quality of government, tolerance to 
corruption and intergenerational social mobility it can be suggested that other societal 
and individual factors, like socio-demographic characteristics, social trust and life 
satisfaction, must be taken into consideration when testing the relation between two 
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variables. Moreover, existing studies on the intergenerational social mobility distinguish 
between the perceived and actual social mobility. This assumption is taken into 
consideration when testing the relationship between intergenerational social mobility 
and tolerance to corruption. Therefore, this research includes data both on the micro 
(individual) and macro (country) level. 
Hypothesis 3: Intergenerational social mobility and higher societal welfare are 
negatively correlated with the tolerance to corruption. 
These aspects are taken later into consideration in model specification (See Section 3.2) 
and defined in more details in data description section (See Section 3.1). 
3. Data and Methodology 
In order to answer the research question quantitative method analysis is applied as a 
preferable when working with and analyzing numerical data (Saunders et al., 2009). 
The quantitative research method allows collecting data both on micro (individual) and 
macro (country) levels and explaining the causal relationship between two variables. By 
running regression with numerical observations, the theories presented above and 
relationship between two variables outlined in the literature review part of this 
research are tested (Field, 2013). Moreover, the cross-sectional design of study allows 
identifying the differences between the groups included in the study and therefore to 
establish patterns in data analysis, drawing a conclusion as a result (Vaus, 2010). As 
previous studies lay the ground for testing the correlation between the tolerance to 
corruption and intergenerational social mobility, it is required to specify the definitions 
of variables included in this study and give explanation how they were converted into 
meaningful data. In this research data on social mobility and tolerance to corruption are 
used as explanatory and response variables respectively. 
3.1 Data Description 
3.1.1 Dependent Variable - Tolerance to Corruption 
The concept of corruption itself is arguable and not easy to measure due to the limited 
access to the reliable data. Therefore measuring of corruption represents often a 
complex set of policies and criteria combined in an average score which are highly 
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questionable by a number of scholars. For example, Keller and Sik (2009) argue that 
measurement of corruption use unreliable data and this limit analysis to very narrow 
version of corruption (Keller & Sik, 2009). Moreover, Morris (2010) believes that the 
actual experience of corruption by civil groups is much lower than the perception of 
corruption and trust in political and bureaucratic institutions. On the contrary lack of 
trust prevent society from taking steps towards fighting corruption and increases 
tolerance towards the existing low quality of institutions at some extent (Morris & 
Klesner, 2010). At the same time Ko et al. (2012) argue that corruption index is not 
defined only by country’s laws but rather depends on people’s attitude and expectations 
of how bureaucratic institution should function (Ko et at., 2012).  Thus, in corrupted 
societies more resources are spent by the officials for the personal use which creates 
decrease in confidence in governmental institutions among the population. Moreover, 
the belief that institutions and government are corrupted is seen as the main barrier in 
creating equal opportunities to succeed through life regardless the family background. 
In other words if corruption is seen as the best and fastest way to higher achievements 
in life it may create the perception that joining the group close to the resources 
distribution is the only option (Rothstein, 2011). 
Due to the arguments presented above the concept of corruption is limited in this 
research by the public tolerance towards corruption. Keller and Sik (2009) distinguish 
active and passive tolerance towards corruption where passive corruption is defined as 
individual’s attitude towards officials accepting bribes whereas active corruption 
measured as officials asking for bribe. In order to measure the active corruption Keller 
and Sik (2009) recommend to use European Value Survey measuring if it is acceptable 
for officials to ask for favor or bribe (Keller & Sik, 2009). However, as this research aims 
to identify the correlation between the public tolerance to corruption and social 
mobility, the definition is limited to the passive corruption. Therefore the measure of 
tolerance to passive corruption is based on the responses received from the citizens in 
the World Value Survey, Wave 6 (2010-2014): 
V202: Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be 
justified (10), never be justified (1), or something in between, using this card: 
Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties 
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3.1.2 Independent Variables 
3.1.2.1Perceived Social Mobility 
As this paper aims to evaluate the effect of intergenerational social mobility on the 
tolerance to corruption in OECD countries it is important to specify the definition of 
social mobility per se. For this purpose the recent OECD publications on 
intergenerational social mobility (Alesina, 2004; Fischer, 2009; Causa & Johansson, 
2010) were exploited and the definition was adapted. Social mobility is used in this 
study as an explanatory variable of tolerance towards corruption. However social 
mobility is difficult to measure due to the limitation in available information over time 
and across generations. Therefore the definition of the concept is adapted from the 
research implemented in OECD countries and was defined as “life experiences of 
individuals differ from those of their parents”. In countries offering equal opportunities 
parent’s background cannot have direct significant impact on their children 
performance. 
Perceived social mobility can be measured by standard questionnaire containing 
questions about equal possibility perceptions in education and escape from poverty. For 
example Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (cited at Fischer, 2009) used this type of 
analysis to measure perceived social mobility in the US and European countries. The 
data obtained contained information of people’s believe to escape poverty throughout 
their life time, equal access to education and laziness as an actual cause of low income.  
The perceived social mobility is measured based on the World Values Survey (WVS, 
Wave 6, 2010-2014) and includes the following factors -confidence in the education 
system (universities) –  
V 119: I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how 
much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence (1), quite a lot of 
confidence (2), not very much confidence (3) or none at all (4)?  
Another variable that captures the level of the perceived social mobility is a belief that 
better life can be achieved through a personal effort (not luck). 
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Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views 
on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you 
agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in 
between, you can choose any number in between. 
V96: Incomes should be made more equal VS We need larger income differences as 
incentives for individual effort 
V100: In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life VS Hard work doesn’t 
generallybring success—it’s more a matterof luck and connections. 
3.1.2.2 Actual Social Mobility 
In countries offering equal opportunities parent’s background cannot have direct 
significant impact on their children performance. However intergenerational mobility 
can be measured numerically by comparing the difference between parent’s and child’s 
income in a long run, i.e. intergenerational earnings elasticity (Becker and Tomes 
(1979) cited at D’Addio, 2007). This helps to assess the impact of parent’s income on 
future child’s economic performance and consequently the actual degree of 
generational income mobility in a country (D’Addio, 2007).   
On the other hand perceived intergenerational social mobility is different from the 
actual social mobility measured by improvement income and social statuses differ from 
their parents. (Fischer, 2009).   
However intergeneration earning elasticity is an average index and cannot measure the 
degree of variations in income mobility ranges and its categories. Moreover 
intergeneration earning elasticity measures father-son rather than total family income 
ignoring earning from mother’s side. Nevertheless the changes in today’s world and 
high involvement of women in labor market may have statistically significant impact on 
the social mobility findings (D’Addio, 2007).  However, other scholars argue that in 
empirical testing father’s educational background has higher effect on son/daughter 
outcomes both in education attainment and future earnings (Nguyen and Getinet, 2003 
cited at Causa, 2009). D’Addio also points out that intergeneration earning elasticity 
methods requires precise definition of sample and time period used as differences in 
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statistical methods may lead to different results and conclusions within the same 
country (D’Addio, 2007).   
Due to the fact that actual social mobility is difficult to define and measure in a single 
number (Hopkins, 2008; Bjørnskov et al., 2013) in broad terms scholars (Fischer, 2009; 
Bjørnskov et al., 2013; D’Addio, 2007) use two major factors to measure the actual 
intergenerational mobility including intergenerational education attainment and 
earnings (wage) elasticity. As this study focuses on OECD countries, the explanation of 
the actual social mobility and data were obtained from the definition at work used by 
the OECD Economic Department.  
The first category grasps the concept of educational attainment in farter/son pair, i.e. 
dependence of child’s educational achievements on parent’s educational background. 
For this purpose PISA student performance in mathematics performance data was 
obtained (OECD, 2014; OECD, 2007, OECD, 2004) based both on the maternal and 
paternal-education dependence, where higher values indicate higher intergenerational 
social mobility whereas lower values indicating educational immobility (Fischer, 2009). 
Another factor impacting actual intergenerational social mobility in the OECD countries 
is earnings elasticity and persistence (Bjørnskov et al., 2013; Hopkins, 2008; Fischer, 
2009, Causa, 2009). It should be noted however, that the data for parents life earnings is 
the data that is difficult to obtain and often measured in an estimation model (Causa, 
2009; D’Addio, 2007; Corak, 2006).Therefore, macro-level data was collected from the 
recent Fischer’s (2009) research on social mobility in the OECD countries, where 0 
indicates complete generation mobility and 1 – complete immobility (Fischer, 2009). 
3.1.3 Control Variables 
3.1.3.1 Social Trust 
The development of the model analyzing the tolerance to corruption effects of the 
intergenerational social mobility includes also other potential factors that may have 
influence in the regression. In this connection the question of general trust in the society 
may denote the tolerance both to active and passive corruption. In other words 
societies with higher trust in institutions and government are generally “happier” and 
more willing to accept the existing state of corruption in a country. Moreover Rothstein 
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(2011) argues that societies with higher level of trust are built on the idea of “social 
solidarity” and belief that each member of a society have equal share of responsibilities. 
On the other hand social trust does not only related to the tolerance to corruption but 
also seen as a way of building equal opportunities. In theory high level of economic 
inequality built upon the increasing earnings gap prevent societies from creating 
welfare programs which may lead to the equal access to education, economic and social 
status regardless the parents’ background. Groups with higher privileges have easier 
access to the resources whereas others are left out from the social insurance programs 
and distribution of the national welfare (Rothstein, 2011). 
Moreover, Fischer (2009) argues that social trust may contribute to the higher 
intergenerational social mobility in a country. Social trust creates positive environment 
for sharing the resources providing economic freedom, which in its turn, triggers higher 
social mobility and protects individuals from being trapped by the family background 
(Fischer, 2009).   
Therefore social trust is included in the analysis as a control variable. The measurement 
is based on the World Value Survey, Wave 6 (2010-2014) question: 
V24: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need 
to be very careful in dealing with people?  
1 Most people can be trusted.   2 Need to be very careful.  
 
3.1.3.2 General Satisfaction with Life 
On the other hand, the attitude towards the level of corruption in a country may be also 
correlated with the general satisfaction with life. In other words different people have 
different objectives in life regardless the objective opportunities offered by the social 
system in a country (Bjørnskov et al., 2013). As it was established earlier in the 
literature review part of this paper, equality of opportunities by itself is a major 
determinant of fairness and access to the social welfare in a country. Rothstein (2011) 
argues that sense of equality of opportunities is directly related to declining segregation 
among the different classes of society and therefore generates higher degree of trust 
both within the society and towards the institutions (Rothstein, 2011).  
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As this study aims to explore the effect of social mobility both perceived and actual on 
the tolerance to corruption, the subjective characteristics of individuals and sense of 
equality of opportunities in a society are accounted and grasped through the concept of 
general satisfaction with life. Micro level data for the OECD countries was extracted 
from the World Value Review, Wave 6 (2010-2014): 
V23: All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? 
Using this card on which 1 means you are “completely dissatisfied” and 10 means you are 
“completely satisfied” where would you put your satisfaction with your life as a whole?   
3.1.3.3 Net National Income 
All things considered economic welfare of a country also plays an important role in the 
individual wellbeing as it has direct impact on educational attainment, earnings level, 
and tolerance to corruption in a society. In other words National wealth is often 
associated with the better and more equal access to education and the quality of 
government institutions (Fischer, 2009). On the other hand most of the OECD countries 
share similar political and economic structure which in theory should lead to the 
equality of opportunities and similar level of social insurance for the population in the 
countries. However the difference of the wellbeing and increasing gap within the society 
prompt that economic structure is not defining factor in the establishing of good 
institutions (Rothstein, 2011).  
Based on this divergent explanation of the role of economic welfare in a country, the Net 
National Income per capita is included in the regression analysis as a control variable.    
3.1.3.4 Other Control Variables 
The demographics of individuals included in the analysis may also affect the tolerance 
to corruption. For example a number of studies on the intergenerational social mobility 
and welfare showed that gender, age, educational background and social class 
(subjective) of the individuals involved in the analysis identify stronger correlation 
between the variables (Fischer, 2009; Bjørnskov et al., 2013). It is therefore may be 
suggested that individual’s background has an effect on social mobility and correlated 
with the tolerance to corruption in a country. The data on population demographics 
included in the World Value Survey and corresponds with the individuals’ responses.  
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Table 1: Measuring Social Mobility and Tolerance to Corruption 
Variable Name Definition 
Tolerance to Corruption  
Passive Corruption 
 
Public attitude towards officials accepting of 
bribes  
1- can never be justifies 
10 – can be justified 
Perceived Social Mobility  
Confidence in Education 
 
 
Individual’s confidence in universities, where 
0 indicates no confidence, 1 –complete 
confidence. 
 
Household income depends on 
individual’s effort  
 
Dummy variable, where 0 indicates that income 
does not depend on individual efforts and 1 – 
individual effort 
Hard work brings success Dummy variable where 0 – success depends on 
luck and connections, and 1 – hard work brings 
success 
Actual Social Mobility  
Intergenerational Income 
Elasticity 
Dependence of one’s own life-time income to 
parental income, based on a father-son 
comparison 
Mobility in educational attainment A measure of dependency of student’s educational 
attainment of her parents’ education - PISA test 
Score 
Social Trust  
Trust in the society Dummy variable,  
1 – most people can be trusted, 0 – need be careful 
Satisfaction with life  
Overall satisfaction with life Ordinal categorical variable  
1 – completely satisfied, 0 –completely 
dissatisfied 
Net National Income  
Net National Income per capita Approximates the level of disposable income in 
the population 
  
The data obtained from the World Value Survey Wave 6 (2010-2014) is then sub 
sampled for 34 OECD countries (See Appendix 1 “The List of OECD countries”) with 
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information for 22 709 individuals from 15 OECD countries. For the country-level 
analysis individual responses from the WVS are aggregated to the macro-level and 
combined with the information on actual intergenerational social mobility, including 
intergenerational income elasticity and mobility in educational attainment, obtained 
from the OECD database (OECD, 2007; OECD, 2014) and Fischer (2009). 
3.2 Model Specification 
In order to address the research question if the tolerance to corruption is correlated 
with the intergenerational social mobility the quantitative analysis of the data available 
for the OECD countries was applied. The quantitative analysis is performed with IBM 
SPSS Statistics software. The correlation between two variables is tested with the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression which generally has the following model: 
                  
Where Yi  is a dependent variable (predicted outcome) and Xi is an independent variable 
and parameter β1 quantify the relationship between two parameters with an error term 
εi and common intercept coefficient β0 (Field, 2013).  
The analysis includes both the effects of the perceived and actual social mobility; in 
addition control variables like socio-demographic characteristics, social trust, 
satisfaction with life and net national income per capita are included in the research in 
order to test alternative impacts on the tolerance to corruption. 
First micro level analysis is applied in order to identify the correlation between the 
perceived social mobility and tolerance to passive corruption on the individual level: 
Model 1: Tolerance of passive corruptioni= β0 + β1Perceived Social Mobility +εi 
The model is further developed by adding control variables, including demographics of 
the population, advanced by adding social trust and general life satisfaction in the 
regression analysis. 
Model 2-5: Tolerance of passive corruptioni= β0 + β1Perceived Social Mobility 
+β2Population Demographics + εi 
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Model 6: Tolerance of passive corruptioni = β0 + β1Perceived Social Mobility 
+β2Population Demographics +  β3Social Trust + εi 
Model 7: Tolerance of passive corruptioni = β0 + β1Perceived Social Mobility + 
β2Population Demographics + β3Social Trust + β4Life Satisfaction + εi 
In further development of the study, actual social mobility is introduced to the 
regression with statistical analysis on the macro (country) level: 
Model 8: Tolerance of corruptioni = β0 + β1Actual Social Mobility + εi 
Model 9: Tolerance of corruptioni= β0 + β1Perceived Social Mobility + β2Actual Social 
Mobility +εi 
Finally, the macro-level analysis is implemented including control variable economic 
welfare of a country (Net National Income): 
Model 10: Tolerance of corruptioni= β0 + β1Perceived Social Mobility +β2Actual Social 
Mobility+ β3Net National Income + εi 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Individual-level Analysis 
First the individual level analysis is performed in order to determine the correlation 
between the perceived intergenerational social mobility and tolerance to corruption in 
the OECD countries. The subsample for OECD countries is extracted from the World 
Value Survey, Wave 6 (2010-2014). Table 2 below presents the descriptive statistics for 
the tolerance to corruption (dependent variable), factors measuring perceived social 
mobility (independent variables), demographics (gender, age, educational background, 
and social class (subjective)), social trust and satisfaction with life (control variables) 
after recoding taking into account missing values. The data was also rescaled to 0-1 
parameter in order to facilitate comparison of variables effect on the tolerance to 
corruption.  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the variables 
Variable N Min Max Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Passive 
Tolerance to 
Corruption 
22267 1 10 1.57 1.447 
Control Variables 
Life Satisfaction 22516 0 1 0.72 0.195 
Social Trust 22145 0 1 0.36 0.481 
Gender 22700 0 1 0.47 0.499 
Age 22686 17 99 47.43 17.545 
Social Class 21897 0 1 0.62 0.178 
Education 22121 0 3 2.14 0.720 
Perceived Social Mobility 
Confidence in 
Universities 
21077 0 1 0.75 0.433 
Income Equality 22033 0 1 0.41 0.491 
Hardworking 
brings success 
22047 0 1 0.70 0.460 
Taking into consideration the missing values, total number of valid individuals 
participated in the survey is 18 872. The analyzed sample is well balanced in gender 
(10754 females (47,4%) and 11946 males (52,6%) from the OECD countries 
participated in the survey) and age (ranging from 17 to 99 years old with the mean 
value 47.43). The biggest share of the interview people has obtained secondary 
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education - 48.7%, 31.7% have university degree, primary education was achieved by 
15.8% and only 1.2% have no formal education. Most of the individuals participated in 
the survey attribute themselves to the middle class (with upper middle class share 
23.0% and lower middle class share 39.0%), working class was indicated by 26.3%, 
whereas upper and lower class 1.1% and 6.1% respectively (See Appendix 2). 
Figure 1 (below) was constructed based on the individual responses on tolerance to 
corruption obtained from the World Value Survey, Wave 6 (2010-2014). Generally in 
the sub-sample of 15 OECD countries the tolerance to corruption is quite low (below 
2.5) with highest index in Mexico (2.2) followed by Sweden (1.8) whereas Japan and 
Turkey have the lowest tolerance to passive corruption (1.3 and 1.2 respectively). 
 
Figure 1: Tolerance to Passive Corruption: Analysis for OECD countries. Data: World 
Value Survey, Wave 6 (2010-2014) 
As tolerance to passive corruption does not follow normal distribution, the value is 
further transformed to logarithmic function in order to hold the first OLS regression 
assumption of data normal distribution (See Appendix 3) (Field, 2013).  
Furthermore, when working with the pooled data it is important to address the problem 
of clustering, i.e. specific countries factors (GDP, size of the population and etc.) that 
may have effect on the individual’s responses and correlation coefficients consequently. 
0
0.5
1
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2
2.5
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Therefore, dummy variables for 15 countries were included in the regression (See full 
regression estimates in Appendix 4).   
26 
 
Table 3: Multiple regression (OLS) estimates of the effect of Social Mobility on Tolerance to Corruption 
 
DV: Tolerance to Corruption 
(1-10) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Confidence in Education  
(0-1) 
-0,063*** 
(0.010) 
-0.063*** 
(0.010) 
-0.060*** 
(0.009) 
-0.044*** 
(0.010) 
-0.042*** 
(0.010) 
-0.040*** 
(0.010) 
-0.047*** 
(0.010) 
Household income depends 
on individual’s effort  
(0-1) 
0.028*** 
(0.008) 
0.026** 
(0.008) 
0.021** 
(0.008) 
0.026** 
(0.008) 
0.024** 
(0.008) 
0.024** 
(0.008) 
0.030*** 
(0.008) 
Hard work brings success 
(0-1) 
-0.053*** 
(0.009) 
-0.043*** 
(0.009) 
-0.042*** 
(0.009) 
-0.040*** 
(0.009) 
-0.047*** 
(0.009) 
-0.047*** 
(0.009) 
-0.041*** 
(0.009) 
Gender  
(0-1) 
 0.066*** 
(0.008) 
0.066*** 
(0.007) 
0.068*** 
(0.008) 
0.067*** 
(0.008) 
0.067*** 
(0.008) 
0.064*** 
(0.008) 
Age 
(17-99) 
  -0.441*** 
(0.022) 
-0.474*** 
(0.023) 
-0.480*** 
(0.023) 
-0.484*** 
(0.024) 
-0.493*** 
(0.024) 
Level of education obtained 
(0-3) 
   -0.040*** 
(0.006) 
-0.041*** 
(0.006) 
-0.041*** 
(0.006) 
-0.041*** 
(0.006) 
Social Class (Subjective) 
(0-1) 
    0.004 
(0.024) 
-0.001 
(0.024) 
-0.039 
(0.024) 
Social Trust (0-1)      -0.017** 
(0.009) 
-0.009 
(0.009) 
Satisfaction with life (0-1)       -0.189*** 
(0.022) 
Constant 0.342*** 
(0.016) 
0.312*** 
(0.016) 
1.044** 
(0.040) 
1.196*** 
(0.047) 
1.198*** 
(0.042) 
1.212*** 
(0.043) 
1.379*** 
(0.056) 
R2 0.026 0.030 0.049 0.041 0.040 0.041 0.044 
N 20261 20255 20248 19757 19279 18938 18872 
*p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001.Standard errors within parentheses. Data: World Value Survey, Wave 6 (2010-2014) 
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The regression analysis starts with measuring correlation between the perceived 
intergenerational social mobility (when all three components are included in the 
regression) and tolerance to passive corruption. The results indicate that all three 
components (confidence in education, believe that household income depends on 
individual’s effort and hard work can bring success) are statistically significant in the 
analysis.  The distinctive factor is the sign of the coefficients included in the regression 
which helps us to predict the correlation between the perceived social mobility and 
tolerance to corruption. Specifically, higher confidence in education is negatively 
correlated with the tolerance to corruption, i.e. 1 unit change in the confidence in 
education leads to decrease in tolerance to corruption by 0.063. Similar impact has the 
question about the effect of hard work or luck in individual’s success. In other words, if 
an individual believes that hard work brings success, his/her tolerance to corruption 
decreases by 0.053. On the contrary, the question of income inequality and the role of 
officials in decreasing inequality gap have positive correlation with the tolerance to 
corruption. This indicates that individuals who rely more on individual efforts in 
decreasing income gap tend to tolerate corruption more, comparing to those who think 
that household income should be equal. However, the R square of the model is quite low 
(0.026) and therefore the model is further improved by introducing the control 
variables. 
Further models (Model 2-5) take into consideration the demographics of the population 
participated in the survey which helps to indicate if gender, age, education and social 
class (subjective) have any effect on tolerance to corruption in a society. The 
characteristics of population demographics are tested separately, and R square 
indicates that the inclusion of all factors in the regression (Model 5) gives the best fit (R 
square equals 0.050). The regression indicates that subjective perception of the social 
class does not correlate with the tolerance to corruption as its coefficient (0.005) is not 
significant in the regression. However, factors of the perceived social mobility 
(confidence in education, believe that household’s income depends on individual’s effort 
and hard work brings success) remain significant with coefficients -0.052, 0.025 and -
0.047 respectively. Moreover, other demographic factors, including gender, age, and 
level of education obtained also show significance in the regression model. Looking at 
the coefficients of the control variables it can be concluded, that obtaining higher level 
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of education leads to the decrease in tolerance to corruption by 0.041 points. Similarly, 
with aging individuals tend to tolerate corruption among the officials less by 0.480 
points. The coefficient of the gender is more difficult to perceive, as dummy variable (0-
male, 1-female) was adapted in the regression. However, from the regression results, it 
can be concluded that women have lower tolerance to corruption comparing to men (β 
coefficient 0.067).      
The next step is to test whether perceived social mobility (including socio-
demographics characteristics) and social trust are correlated with the tolerance to 
corruption in the society. The model shows a better fit as R square increases to 0.051. 
The factors of the perceived social mobility still show strong correlation with the 
tolerance to corruption. Moreover, the socio-demographic characteristics also have 
strong correlation with the dependent variable (gender 0.067; Age -0.485; level of 
education obtained -0.041). However, subjective perception of the social class does not 
affect the tolerance to corruption as its coefficient (0.001) is insignificant in the model. 
Social trust, included as a control variable in the regression,shows significance with 
p<0.01with negative correlation to tolerance to corruption, i.e. with increase of 1 in 
social trust the tolerance to corruption is decreased by -0.017.  
Finally, the model includes general satisfaction with life as a control variable. In this 
case the model shows the best fit of the data and the theoretical assumptions with R 
square 0.055. The model indicates the negative significant correlation between the life 
satisfaction and tolerance to corruption showing with the change in life satisfaction by 1 
the tolerance to corruption decreases by 0.189 points. As for the main independent 
variables measuring the perceived intergenerational social mobility, the confidence in 
education is negatively correlated with the tolerance to corruption (coefficient -0.047), 
which means that higher confidence in education leads to the decrease in tolerance of 
corruption. Similarly, if an individual believe that hard work brings success in life, 
his/her tolerance to corruption decreases by 0.030 points. On the other hand, if an 
individual thinks that income equality can be achieved by personal efforts, it increases 
tolerance to corruption by 0.041. Socio-demographic characteristics of an individual 
hold significant coefficients for gender, age and highest level of education obtained 
(0.064, -0.493 and -0.041 respectively). However, subjective measure of social class and 
general trust in the society are not significant in the model.  
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4.2 Country-level Analysis 
For the country analysis, the data obtained from the World Value Survey, Wave 6 (2010-
2014) on the individual level is aggregated to the macro-level with the subsample for 
OECD countries. WVS (2010-2014) contains data for 15 OECD countries. Further data 
available on actual social mobility characteristics in OECD countries (educational social 
mobility and intergenerational earnings elasticity) is combined in one dataset. However, 
due to the scarcity of the data for the actual social mobility, the subsample decreases to 
12 countries for the mobility in educational attainment and only five countries if 
intergenerational earnings elasticity is included (See Appendix 5). It is difficult to draw 
statistically significant conclusion based on this small sample; therefore, measure of the 
intergenerational social mobility was dropped from the analysis. However, the results of 
intergenerational educational attainment can still help to see some general trends.  
Table 4: Multiple regression (OLS) estimates of the effect of Actual and perceived Social 
Mobility on Tolerance to Corruption 
 
DV: Tolerance to Corruption 
(1-10) 
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Intergenerational 
Educational Attainment 
-0.005** 
(0.001) 
-0.005* 
(0.002) 
-0.005* 
(0.002) 
Confidence in Education  
(0-1) 
 -0.087 
(0.284) 
-0.081 
(0.294) 
Household income depends 
on individual’s effort  
(0-1) 
 0.084 
(0.171) 
0.074 
(0.178) 
Hard work brings success 
(0-1) 
 -0.099 
(0.264) 
-0.075 
(0.275) 
NNI per capita   -0.074 
(0.101) 
Constant 0.391*** 
(0.038) 
0.511 
(0.409) 
0.817 
(0.595) 
R2 0.629 0.669 0.696 
N 13 13 13 
*p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001.Standard errors within parentheses. Data: World Value Survey Wave 6 (2010-
2014); OECD, Society at Glance, (2004-2009)   
First model, testing the correlation between the actual social mobility measure in terms 
of the intergenerational educational attainment and tolerance to corruption shows 
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negative correlation with coefficient -0.005. In other words, lower social mobility leads 
to higher tolerance of corruption.  
Model 9 includes the characteristics of actual and perceived social mobility. The fit of 
the data is better with R square 0.669. However, with the inclusion of perceived social 
mobility, the intergenerational educational attainment become less significant 
(significant when p<0.05) whereas factors of the perceived social mobility (confidence 
in education, importance of individual’s efforts in household income and hard work) 
become insignificant in the model.  
Finally, Net National Income per capita (Log NNI) is included in the analysis. The model 
shows, that only intergenerational social mobility has significant correlation with 
tolerance to corruption whereas (-0.005), factors of the perceived social mobility and 
NNI does not have significant effect on the tolerance to corruption in a society. 
It still should be noted, that the obtained results cannot be considered as a conclusive 
due to the scarcity of the data available both for the measurement of Perceived Social 
Mobility (World Value Survey, Wave 6 2010-2014) and actual social mobility (OECD, 
Society at Glance 2007) in the OECD countries.   
4.3 Discussion of the Results 
The regression analysis of the factors of perceived social mobility and tolerance to 
corruption performed on the individual level for OECD countries indicates that two 
indicators are correlated. Specifically, it can be concluded that both higher confidence in 
education and believe that success depends on a personal effort but not luck leads to 
lower tolerance to corruption in a society, whereas belief that income should be made 
more equal (regardless the personal efforts) is positively correlated with the low 
tolerance to corruption. 
For further analysis socio-demographic characteristics of the individuals participated in 
the survey were included in the analysis as control variables.In this case the coefficients 
of perceived social mobility of all three factors (confidence in education, household’s 
income depends on individual’s effort, and hard work brings success) decreased (-0.063 
vs -0.052; 0.028 vs 0.025; -0.053 vs -0.047 respectively) which indicates that correlation 
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between the perceived social mobility and tolerance to corruption is also driven by the 
personal socio-demographic characteristics, including gender, age, level of education 
obtained and subjective attribution to a social class (Model 5). However, social status 
(subjective) does not have significant correlation with tolerance to corruption. On the 
other hand, model indicates that women are generally less tolerant to corruption; 
moreover, older people are less tolerant to corruption than younger people; similar 
effect has education, i.e. people with higher level of education are less tolerant to 
corruption. Similar effect was indicated by Fischer (2009) that perceived social mobility 
at an individual level analysis is captured by the socio-demographic characteristics or 
personal history per se. 
Introducing social trust to the regression does not change the coefficients of other 
variables significantly (see Model 4), however indicates the importance of the control 
variable in the analysis. In other words, if an individual generally trust people it 
increases his/her tolerance to corruption by 0.017 points.  
Nonetheless, including general satisfaction with life shows the best fit of the model with 
r square 0.056 and, interestingly enough, this eliminates the significance of social trust 
in the regression. Moreover, the coefficients of confidence of education and belief that 
hard work brings success in life are decreased to -0.047 and -0.041 respectively, 
whereas the question of income difference used as an incentive for individual effort 
becomes stronger 0.030 indicating that individual’s satisfaction with life is one of the 
most significant factors in addressing the question of the perceived social mobility and 
tolerance to corruption. In other words, as it was previously argued in theory, the belief 
of equality of opportunities offered in a society decreases class segregation and 
therefore leads to higher trust to institutions and lower tolerance to corruption as a 
result. 
However, perceived social mobility does not always reflect the actual intergenerational 
social mobility in a country as it is rather a measurement of beliefs and perceptions 
rather than an indication of social and economic opportunities offered in a society. This 
phenomenon may be related to the misconception and individual understanding of a 
social mobility, a bright confidence in future life development whereas in reality, actual 
mobility may not be that optimistic (Fischer, 2009). It is therefore the further analysis 
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exploiting the characteristics of actual social mobility (intergenerational educational 
attainments and earning elasticity) was conducted on a macro level.    
Macro-level analysis (Models 8-10) includes the characteristics of actual social mobility 
(intergenerational education attainment) in the analysis eliminates the significant effect 
of the perceived social mobility, indicating that in a countries with equal opportunities 
in education offered to the students regardless their parents’ background show lower 
tolerance to corruption.  Introduction of the Net National Income per capita as a control 
variable in macro-level analysis does not change the correlation coefficient of the 
intergenerational educational attainment (-0.005) however it becomes significant only 
with p<0.05. NNI per capita itself is not statistically significant in the regression, i.e. 
does not have strong effect on tolerance to corruption under this model. Nevertheless 
the number of observations (13 OECD countries) included in the analysis is too small to 
draw any final statistical conclusion from the suggested models. 
4.4 Limitations 
It is important to point out limitations of this paper that may have effect the results of 
the study. This study aimed to investigate the correlation between intergenerational 
social mobility and tolerance to corruption. As previously discussed in the paper, the 
existing literature differentiates between the perceived and actual intergenerational 
social mobility. Throughout the process of collecting data for this research a number of 
obstacles occurred which limited significantly the scope of the study. Specifically, the 
data on the actual social mobility in the OECD countries is quite limited and was 
collected from different sources (Fischer, 2009; D’Addio, 2007; Bjørnskov, 2013).It is 
important to note that organized and comprehensive on the intergenerational social 
mobility is available only for the OECD countries. The aspect of scarcity of the data was 
pointed out in the results discussion (See Section 4.3) and it was emphasized that no 
final conclusion can be drawn for the macro-level analysis exploiting the available data 
on the actual social mobility. Further research would benefit from a larger sample of 
countries included in the study and will allow to perform a stronger analysis of the 
correlation.  
33 
 
Another limitation in methodology of this research is use of cross-section data which 
does not allow seeing the variations in correlation over time, for example comparing to 
the panel data (Vaus, 2010). On the other hand, intergenerational social mobility 
involves the comparison of at least two generations in a family (farther/son pair). 
However there is no data available in order to trace the effect of parental views and 
believes in perceived social mobility and tolerance to corruption on their children. 
Future research may benefit from applying case study analysis or multi-level regression 
analysis when working on the aspect of social mobility and tolerance to corruption. 
5. Conclusion 
This study was developed in order to identify the role of the intergenerational social 
mobility in tolerance to corruption with the focus on OECD countries. Intergenerational 
social mobility was previously thoroughly researched in connection with the country’s 
economic welfare whereas the connection with tolerance to corruption is inconclusive 
in the social field studies. On the other hand, the discussion of corruption in the context 
of quality of government often refers to the impartiality of institutions and equality of 
opportunities offered to an individual in a country as a prerequisite to development. 
Therefore this researched aimed to bridge two fields of discussion and sought to answer 
the following questions: 
 Does intergenerational social mobility affect the tolerance to corruption in the 
OECD countries? 
 What is the tolerance to corruption effects of the intergenerational social 
mobility in the OECD countries? 
Throughout the study two measurement of intergenerational social mobility accepted 
by the scholars were defined – perceived and actual social mobility. Perceived social 
mobility captures the confidence in education and belief that poverty can be escaped by 
individual’s efforts, whereas actual social mobility is a measurement of improvement in 
educational attainment and earning elasticity with regard to parents’ achievements. 
Hence this study adapted both definitions and merged together data sources available 
on perceived social mobility (World Values Survey) and actual social mobility (OECD, 
Society at Glance), introducing other control variables, like socio-demographic 
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characteristics, general satisfaction with life, trust in society, and economic factors (NNI 
per capita).  
The main empirical findings were summarized in the results discussion (See Section 
4.3) and indicated that intergenerational social mobility has negative effect on the 
tolerance to corruption in OECD countries. In other words if an individual perceive the 
society he/she living in as a mobile, he/she tend to tolerate corruption on a lesser 
degree. The results of the study hold significant when controlling for socio-demographic 
factors, social trust and general satisfaction with life. Moreover, as this study exploited 
pooled data from 15 OECD countries, the analysis also included statistical control for 
avoiding clustering of the results.  
The results obtained on micro (individual) level analysis support the theoretical 
assumption that more mobile societies tend to tolerate corruption on a much lesser 
degree comparing to the immobile societies. Macro-level analysis also support this 
assumption, however, as the phenomenon of the actual social mobility is quite difficult 
to capture due to the scarcity of the data available, it is cannot be treated as a conclusive 
statement.  
This study offered initial steps in analyzing the theoretical assumption that tolerance to 
corruption may be correlated with how mobile a society is. It connected two broad 
social fields of researches – corruption (as a part of quality of government) and social 
mobility which is exploited more often in the studies of economic growth and welfare.  
On the other hand, answers to the research question allow assessing socio-economic 
factors that have direct impact on tolerance to corruption in a society and therefore can 
further help in drawing policy recommendations of controlling corruption in a country. 
The analysis also helps to evaluate more thoroughly these concepts in connection with 
the characteristics of society in the modern world including benefits on the individual 
level. Moreover this research contributes to the understanding why some countries 
succeeded in maintaining high quality of governance with low level of corruption 
whereas others trapped with dysfunctional political institutions. 
As it was argued earlier in this research, corruption is a “hierarchical phenomenon” and 
in immobile societies it is a direct way of establishing order and structure as a 
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coordination mechanism. Hence, higher social class fractionalization in a country 
diminishes the system of controls in a society and risk to increase of corruption in the 
long term. 
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Appendices 
1. List of OECD countries 
No Country Date Country Code 
in WVS 
1 Australia 7 June 1971 36 
2 Austria 29 September 1961 40 
3 Belgium 13 September 1961 56 
4 Canada 10 April 1961 124 
5 Chile 7 May 2010 152 
6 Czech Republic 21 December 1995 203 
7 Denmark 30 May 1961 208 
8 Estonia 9 December 2010 233 
9 Finland 28 January 1969 246 
10 France 7 August 1961 250 
11 Germany 27 September 1961 276 
12 Greece 27 September 1961 300 
13 Hungary 7 May 1996 348 
14 Iceland 5 June 1961 352 
15 Ireland 17 August 1961 372 
16 Israel 7 September 2010 376 
17 Italy 29 March 1962 380 
18 Japan 28 April 1964 392 
19 Korea 12 December 1996 410 
20 Luxemburg 7 December 1961 442 
21 Mexico 18 May 1994 484 
22 Netherlands 13 November 1961 528 
23 New Zealand 29 may 1973 554 
24 Norway 4 July 1961 578 
25 Poland 22 November 1996 616 
26 Portugal 4 August 1961 620 
27 Slovak Republic 14 December 2000 703 
28 Slovenia 21 July 2010 705 
29 Spain 3 August 1961 724 
30 Sweden 28 September 1961 752 
31 Switzerland 28 September 1961 756 
32 Turkey 2 August 1961 792 
33 United Kingdom 2 May 1961 826 
34 United States 12 April 1961 840 
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2. Descriptive Statistics of individuals included in the survey  
Variable N Min Max Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Passive 
Tolerance to 
Corruption 
22267 1 10 1.57 1.447 
Control Variables 
Life Satisfaction 22516 0 1 0.72 0.195 
Social Trust 22145 0 1 0.36 0.481 
Gender 22700 0 1 0.47 0.499 
Age 22686 17 99 47.43 17.545 
Social Class 21897 0 1 0.62 0.178 
Education 22121 0 3 2.14 0.720 
Perceived Social Mobility 
Confidence in 
Universities 
21077 0 1 0.75 0.433 
Income Equality 22033 0 1 0.41 0.491 
Hardworking 
brings success 
22047 0 1 0.70 0.460 
 
Frequency Tables 
Gender Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
0 11946 52.6 52.6 
1 10754 47.4 47.4 
Total 22700 100.0 100.0 
Missing System 9 0  
TOTAL 22709 100.0  
 
Highest Level of 
Education Obtained 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
0 275 1.2 1.2 
1 3589 15.8 16.2 
2 11068 48.7 50.0 
3 7189 31.7 32.5 
Total 22121 97.4 100.0 
Missing System 588 2.6  
TOTAL 22709 100.0  
 
Social Class 
(Subjective) 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Upper Class 251 1.1 1.1 
Upper Middle Class 5219 23.0 23.8 
Lower Middle Class 9064 39.9 41.4 
Working Class 5968 26.3 27.3 
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Lower Class 1395 6.1 6.4 
Total 21897 96.4 100.0 
Missing System 812 3.6  
TOTAL 22709 100.0  
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3. Tolerance to passive corruption: Histogram 
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4. Multiple regression (OLS) estimates of the effect of Social Mobility on Tolerance to Corruption with Countries Dummies 
DV: Tolerance to 
Corruption (1-10) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Confidence in Education  
(0-1) 
-0,063*** 
(0.010) 
-0.063*** 
(0.010) 
-0.060*** 
(0.009) 
-0.044*** 
(0.010) 
-0.042*** 
(0.010) 
-0.040*** 
(0.010) 
-0.047*** 
(0.010) 
Household income 
depends on individual’s 
effort  
(0-1) 
0.028*** 
(0.008) 
0.026** 
(0.008) 
0.021** 
(0.008) 
0.026** 
(0.008) 
0.024** 
(0.008) 
0.024** 
(0.008) 
0.030*** 
(0.008) 
Hard work brings success 
(0-1) 
-0.053*** 
(0.009) 
-0.043*** 
(0.009) 
-0.042*** 
(0.009) 
-0.040*** 
(0.009) 
-0.047*** 
(0.009) 
-0.047*** 
(0.009) 
-0.041*** 
(0.009) 
Australia  -0.071*** 
(0.018) 
-0.068*** 
(0.018) 
-0.050* 
(0.018) 
-0.052* 
(0.018) 
-0.051* 
(0.018) 
-0.052* 
(0.020) 
-0.052* 
(0.020) 
Chile 0.038* 
(0.022) 
0.037* 
(0.022) 
0.014 
(0.022) 
0.014 
(0.022) 
0.014 
(0.022) 
0.008 
(0.022) 
-0.007 
(0.022) 
Estonia -0.006 
(0.019) 
-0.005 
(0.019) 
-0.013 
(0.019) 
-0.016 
(0.019) 
-0.015 
(0.019) 
-0.025 
(0.019) 
-0.023 
(0.019) 
Germany 0.042* 
(0.017) 
0.041* 
(0.017) 
0.039 
(0.017) 
0.038 
(0.017) 
0.038 
(0.017) 
0.008 
(0.018) 
0.006 
(0.018) 
Japan -0.064*** 
(0.017) 
-0.067*** 
(0.017) 
-0.064*** 
(0.017) 
-0.062*** 
(0.017) 
-0.063*** 
(0.017) 
-0.077*** 
(0.018) 
-0.074*** 
(0.018) 
South Korea 0.025 
(0.019) 
0.025 
(0.019) 
0.025 
(0.019) 
0.003 
(0.019) 
0.001 
(0.019) 
-0.004 
(0.019) 
-0.001 
(0.019) 
Mexico 0.136*** 
(0.017) 
0.135*** 
(0.017) 
0.083*** 
(0.017) 
0.079*** 
(0.017) 
0.079*** 
(0.017) 
0.046* 
(0.017) 
0.047* 
(0.018) 
Netherlands -0.069*** 
(0.018) 
-0.069*** 
(0.018) 
-0.050* 
(0.018) 
-0.050* 
(0.018) 
-0.050* 
(0.018) 
-0.062*** 
(0.018) 
-0.059** 
(0.018) 
New Zealand -0.035 -0.030 -0.024 -0.023 -0.023 -0.024 -0.008 
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(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) 
Poland -0.070** 
(0.023) 
-0.069** 
(0.023) 
-0.079*** 
(0.022) 
-0.081*** 
(0.022) 
-0.081*** 
(0.022) 
-0.102*** 
(0.023) 
-0.095*** 
(0.023) 
Slovenia -0.083*** 
(0.021) 
-0.080*** 
(0.021) 
-0.086*** 
(0.021) 
-0.086*** 
(0.021) 
-0.086*** 
(0.021) 
-0.101*** 
(0.021) 
-0.098*** 
(0.022) 
Spain -0.058** 
(0.020) 
-0.058* 
(0.020) 
-0.072*** 
(0.020) 
-0.074*** 
(0.020) 
-0.073*** 
(0.020) 
-0.111*** 
(0.021) 
-0.109*** 
(0.021) 
Sweden 0.123*** 
(0.020) 
0.124*** 
(0.20) 
0.118*** 
(0.020) 
0.111*** 
(0.020) 
0.113*** 
(0.020) 
0.103*** 
(0.020) 
0.102*** 
(0.020) 
Turkey -0.148*** 
(0.018) 
-0.149*** 
(0.018) 
-0.197*** 
(0.018) 
-0.197*** 
(0.018) 
-0.198*** 
(0.018) 
-0.234*** 
(0.019) 
-0.234*** 
(0.019) 
Gender  
(0-1) 
 0.066*** 
(0.008) 
0.066*** 
(0.007) 
0.068*** 
(0.008) 
0.067*** 
(0.008) 
0.067*** 
(0.008) 
0.064*** 
(0.008) 
Age 
(17-99) 
  -0.441*** 
(0.022) 
-0.474*** 
(0.023) 
-0.480*** 
(0.023) 
-0.484*** 
(0.024) 
-0.493*** 
(0.024) 
Level of education 
obtained (0-3) 
   -0.040*** 
(0.006) 
-0.041*** 
(0.006) 
-0.041*** 
(0.006) 
-0.041*** 
(0.006) 
Social Class (Subjective) 
(0-1) 
    0.004 
(0.024) 
-0.001 
(0.024) 
-0.039 
(0.024) 
Social Trust (0-1)      -0.017** 
(0.009) 
-0.009 
(0.009) 
Satisfaction with life (0-1)       -0.189*** 
(0.022) 
Constant 0.342*** 
(0.016) 
0.312*** 
(0.016) 
1.044** 
(0.040) 
1.196*** 
(0.047) 
1.198*** 
(0.042) 
1.212*** 
(0.043) 
1.379*** 
(0.056) 
R2 0.026 0.030 0.049 0.041 0.040 0.041 0.044 
N 20261 20255 20248 19757 19279 18938 18872 
*p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001.Standard errors within parentheses. Data: World Value Survey, Wave 6 (2010-2014) 
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5. Aggregated data: Perceived and Actual Social Mobility in OECD countries 
Country Name 
Country 
Code Log_corruption 
Confidence 
in 
education Income Luck 
Educational 
Attainment 
Earning 
Elasticity NNI Log_NNI 
Australia 36 0,19 0,82 0,38 0,8 35,44 0,16 27458 4,44 
Chile 152 0,32 0,62 0,21 0,66 
    Estonia 233 0,25 0,92 0,2 0,58 
    Germany 276 0,3 0,86 0,21 0,65 29,72 0,32 26213 4,42 
Japan 392 0,19 0,66 0,42 0,67 33,87 
 
24607 4,39 
South Korea 410 0,31 0,67 0,68 0,68 30,77 
 
18385 4,26 
Mexico 484 0,4 0,75 0,47 0,8 11,07 
 
9911 4 
Netherlands 528 0,2 0,78 0,55 0,64 28,56 
 
29781 4,47 
New Zealand 554 0,23 0,81 0,45 0,81 32,25 
 
19677 4,29 
Poland 616 0,2 0,76 0,63 0,5 55,1 
 
11373 4,06 
Slovenia 705 0,18 0,63 0,16 0,69 
    Spain 724 0,21 0,77 0,44 0,72 27,14 0,32 22724 4,36 
Sweden 752 0,37 0,88 0,41 0,76 2,48 0,27 28693 4,46 
Turkey 792 0,13 0,69 0,37 0,66 50,23 
 
9678 3,99 
United States 840 0,28 0,64 0,51 0,78 34,53 0,47 36662 4,56 
Data: World Value Survey, Wave 6 (2010-2014) (aggregated), OECD Society at Glance (aggregated) 
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6. Students Performance in Mathematics (PISA 2003 Score) in Connection with Highest Level of Education Obtained by 
Fathers 
 
 
Country 
Fathers with completed primary 
or lower secondary education  
Fathers with completed upper 
secondary education  
Fathers with completed tertiary 
education 
  
Percentage  
of students 
S.E. 
Performance 
Percentage  
of students 
S.E. 
Performance 
Percentage  
of students  
S.E. 
Performance 
  
Mathematics 
scale 
Mathematics 
scale 
Mathematics 
scale 
  Mean 
score 
S.E. 
Mean 
score 
S.E. 
Mean 
score 
S.E. 
OECD Countries     
 
  
 
  
    
  
 Australia 23,8 (0,6) 505 (3,3) 34,4 (0,5) 516 (2,1) 41,8 (0,8) 551 (2,8) 
Austria 10,9 (0,7) 471 (5,9) 50,8 (1,1) 511 (3,9) 38,3 (1,0) 517 (3,9) 
Belgium 14,9 (0,5) 502 (4,4) 38,7 (0,8) 536 (2,5) 46,4 (0,9) 565 (2,9) 
Canada 11,9 (0,4) 511 (2,7) 39,1 (0,6) 529 (1,7) 49,0 (0,8) 552 (2,2) 
Czech Republic 3,3 (0,3) 465 (11,5) 76,5 (0,8) 513 (3,0) 20,2 (0,8) 575 (4,8) 
Denmark 18,6 (1,0) 486 (4,1) 43,2 (0,9) 508 (2,9) 38,2 (1,2) 549 (3,5) 
Finland 21,9 (0,6) 525 (3,0) 27,1 (0,7) 538 (2,8) 51,0 (0,9) 560 (2,2) 
France 28,8 (1,0) 489 (4,6) 40,5 (1,1) 520 (2,5) 30,7 (1,2) 539 (3,7) 
Germany 19,2 (0,9) 454 (5,4) 44,5 (0,9) 520 (3,8) 36,3 (0,9) 549 (3,8) 
Greece 32,8 (1,5) 419 (3,8) 34,4 (0,9) 450 (3,7) 32,9 (1,6) 466 (5,8) 
Hungary 9,2 (0,6) 425 (6,5) 67,8 (1,0) 482 (2,8) 23,0 (1,0) 546 (4,8) 
Iceland 20,1 (0,6) 497 (3,8) 50,3 (1,0) 514 (2,3) 29,6 (0,9) 534 (2,9) 
Ireland 31,4 (0,9) 482 (3,2) 40,4 (0,9) 507 (2,8) 28,3 (1,1) 531 (3,8) 
Italy 40,9 (0,9) 442 (3,6) 33,6 (0,6) 485 (3,4) 25,5 (0,8) 482 (3,8) 
Japan 16,4 (0,9) 492 (7,0) 37,3 (0,9) 524 (4,4) 46,3 (1,0) 558 (4,8) 
Korea 23,6 (0,8) 506 (4,0) 40,7 (1,1) 541 (3,1) 35,7 (1,3) 572 (5,6) 
48 
 
Luxembourg 21,3 (0,7) 461 (3,6) 35,0 (0,8) 499 (3,0) 43,6 (0,8) 523 (2,2) 
Mexico 61,7 (1,7) 366 (3,2) 12,5 (0,6) 426 (4,8) 25,8 (1,3) 415 (5,3) 
Netherlands 24,4 (1,1) 524 (5,0) 35,7 (1,2) 541 (3,3) 40,0 (1,1) 570 (3,5) 
New Zealand 18,1 (0,7) 495 (4,0) 52,5 (0,9) 529 (2,5) 29,4 (0,8) 562 (3,7) 
Norway 9,5 (0,6) 473 (5,3) 41,7 (1,1) 490 (2,8) 48,8 (1,2) 513 (3,1) 
Poland 8,5 (0,5) 454 (6,7) 76,9 (0,8) 485 (2,4) 14,5 (0,7) 540 (4,1) 
Portugal 62,9 (1,3) 456 (3,1) 17,0 (0,8) 498 (3,5) 20,2 (1,0) 486 (6,6) 
Slovak Republic 5,1 (0,7) 426 (12,3) 74,4 (1,0) 490 (3,1) 20,5 (1,0) 553 (4,1) 
Spain 43,3 (1,5) 469 (2,9) 26,4 (0,8) 488 (3,0) 30,3 (1,4) 516 (3,0) 
Sweden 23,9 (0,8) 491 (3,4) 30,8 (0,9) 520 (3,3) 45,3 (1,1) 522 (3,4) 
Switzerland 29,5 (1,0) 491 (3,6) 32,4 (0,8) 542 (2,9) 38,0 (1,0) 551 (4,7) 
Turkey 58,8 (2,1) 395 (4,2) 22,7 (1,0) 444 (6,9) 18,5 (1,6) 494 (15,2) 
United States 11,2 (0,7) 439 (4,7) 52,0 (1,1) 479 (2,7) 36,8 (1,1) 513 (3,7) 
     OECD Total 24,3 (0,4) 439 (1,6) 42,0 (0,4) 497 (1,1) 33,7 (0,3) 526 (1,3) 
     OECD Average 24,4 (0,2) 460 (1,1) 42,0 (0,2) 505 (0,6) 33,6 (0,2) 534 (0,8) 
Data: OECD (2004). Learning for Tomorrow’s World: First Results from PISA 2003 
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7. Students with Tertiary Education by Parents’ Educational Attainment 
(2012) 
 
 Country Parents with 
tertiary 
education 
% 
Parents with 
educational 
attainment below 
upper secondary 
education 
% 
Parents with upper 
secondary or post-
secondary non-
tertiary education as 
highest level of 
attainment 
% 
Japan 76,42 1,87 21,70 
Canada 73,14 3,07 23,79 
Norway 72,59 6,07 21,33 
Sweden 68,22 5,59 26,20 
Estonia 66,94 1,68 31,38 
Germany 65,42 2,22 32,36 
Denmark 63,23 6,90 29,87 
Netherlands 61,21 13,30 25,50 
Australia 59,18 16,33 24,49 
United States 57,98 8,15 33,87 
Finland 55,81 5,01 39,18 
United Kingdom 55,23 3,50 41,27 
Austria 54,52 2,70 42,78 
Ireland 51,06 15,79 33,15 
France 49,72 9,61 40,67 
South Korea 46,73 10,15 43,12 
Poland 39,17 1,38 59,45 
Slovak Republic 38,83 1,97 59,20 
Czech Republic 37,77   62,13 
Spain 37,08 33,26 29,66 
Italy 27,75 24,46 47,78 
    
Data: OECD (2014). Education at Glance 2014: OECD Indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
